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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tion of 1290-a is not limited to prosecutions which would have formerly been
"obtaining money by false pretenses".
REFUSALS TO ANSWER QUESTIONS CONCERNING SAMM SUBJECT MATTER CON-
STITUTE A SINGLE CONTEMPT
In one of the numerous cases arising out of the so-called "Apalachin meet-
ing" of November 1957, the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for resen-
tence the conviction of the defendant in People v. Riela.38 The defendant, Riela,
was called as a witness before the Grand Jury investigating the meeting which
he and some sixty others had attended at the country estate of the late foseph
Barbara in Apalachin, New York. He refused to answer seventeen questions
concerning that meeting on the ground that to do so might tend to incriminate
him. He again refused to answer all seventeen questions when he was granted
immunity pursuant to Section 2447 of the New York Penal Law.39
Because of his refusal to answer although granted immunity, he was in-
dicted, convicted, 40 and sentenced for seventeen separate crimes of contempt in
violation of New York Penal Law Section 600.41 On each of the 17 counts he
received a sixty day sentence, to be served concurrently, and a fine of $250,
making a total fine of $4250.
Defendant appealed unsuccessfully to the Appellate Division,42 and finally
brought his case to the Court of Appeals. Riela defended his refusal to answer
on the ground that the immunity granted him was not broad enough to assure
him the protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Court brushed this objection aside and pointed out that it was clear
under current decision, that a witness may be compelled to answer in a state
proceeding, as long as the immunity granted by the state protects against
prosecution under its laws, even though it may not protect against prosecution
by the federal government or by other states.
In remitting the case for resentence, the Court of Appeals in a unanimous
opinion reversed sixteen of the seventeen counts, holding that defendant's re-
fusal to answer the seventeen questions constituted a single contempt of court
and not seventeen separate offenses. The Court found that the defendant had
38. 7 N.Y. 571, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960).
39. (1). In any investigation or proceeding where by express provision of a
statute, a competent authority is authorized to confer immunity, if a person refuses
to answer a question or produce evidence of any kind on the ground that he may
be incriminated thereby, and, notwithstanding such a refusal, an order is made by
such competent authority that such person answer the question or produce the
evidence, such person shall comply with the order. If such person complies with
the order, and if, but for this section he would have been privileged to withhold
the answer given or the evidence produced by him, then immunity shall be con-
ferred upon him, as provided for herein.
40. 14 Misc. 2d 213, 178 N.Y.S.2d 873 (County Ct. 1958).
41. A person who commits a contempt of court, of any one of the following
kinds is guilty of a misdemeanor: . . . (6). Contumacious and unlawful refusal
to be sworn as a witness, or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper
interrogatory; ....
42. 9 A.D.2d 481, 195 N.Y.S.2d 558 (3d Dep't 1959).
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"carved out an area of refusal" such that the District Attorney necessarily
knew, ahead of time, that the refusal would be reiterated after each question.
The holding in this case serves as an effective shield for a witness who
would otherwise find himself charged with criminal contempt just as often as
an ingenious prosecutor was able to think of a new way of approaching the
object of his questioning.
Similarly in Yates v. United States,43 where the defendant refused to
answer eleven questions about the membership of her friends in the Communist
Party on the ground that to do so would hurt them and their families, the
U. S. Supreme Court held that a prosecutor might not multiply contempts
by repeated questioning on the same subject of inquiry about which a recal-
citrant witness had already refused answers.
The Court in the instant case distinguished the refusal of a witness to
answer questions in a certain area which the prosecutor knows will go un-
answered, from the bonafide interrogation of the District Attorney in People
v. Saperstein,44 wherein the defendant refused to tell who were the persons
with whom he had spoken in five different telephone conversations. According
to the Court in the instant case, the prosecutor in the Saperstein case had to
continue questioning in order to find the limits of the defendant's refusal to
answer. After a witness's refusal to answer an initial question we are thus left
with the anomaly that the criminality of his subsequent refusal to answer
depends not on the witness's intent but upon that of the prosecutor. Of
course a witness may avoid this simply by spelling out after his first refusal the
precise extent to which he is in contempt of court, but such a course of action
might reveal precisely what he is attempting to conceal.
A better rule, perhaps implicit though unarticulated in the instant case,
is that a witness may be adjudged guilty of contempt only once for each
general subject concerning which he refuses to testify.
EXTORTION WITHOUT DIRECT AssERTIoN OF FORCE
In People v. Diogardi8 the defendants were convicted upon a jury verdict
for extortion and conspiracy to extort. The Appellate Division reversed the
judgments of conviction on the facts and on the law and dismissed the indict-
ment.40 On appeal to the Court of Appeals,47 the Court, examining the testi-
mony from the point of view most favorable to the people, had to determine
as a question of law whether there was a question of fact regarding defendants'
guilt which should have been let to the jury and not been disposed of by the
Appellate Division.48 The Court of Appeals held that such a question of fact
43. 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
44. 2 N.Y.2d 210, 159 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1957).
45. 8 N.Y.2d 260, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1960).
46. 8 A3D.2d 426, 188 N.YS.2d 84 (Ist Dep't 1959).
47. N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 519.
48. People v. Bellows, 281 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E.2d 238 (1939).
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